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INTRODUCTION
The concern, recently, is to minimize irrational panic in response to crises and this
reveals a dysfunctional pattern of thinking. The real challenge is not the particular
crisis of the financial system which everyone talks about, but lies in the pattern of
derivitive thinking that has sustained the system and denied its problematic
nature. A basic question arises: does our way of thinking deny the existence of
other systemic challenges and repress consideration of potential implications in
other areas like the crisis of democracy and climate change? Is the subprime crisis,
and its consequences for the financial system an indicator of a dysfunctional mode
of thought in which we collectively participate today? Many social, political and
economic organizations, even nation states have forgotten about the public good
and concentrate on narrow individual and institutional self-interests. Governments
serve politicians and corporate interests rather than the public good; educational
institutions serve educational bureaucracies instead of their students, parents and
societies. 
In this era of unprecedented economic growth for some and financial melt-
down for many in the developed world, the imperative of achieving sustainable
development and transparency may seem more illusionary than aspirational.
Economic globalization provides both new opportunities and increasing inequali-
ties. The positive improvement of many lives around the world is contrasted to
alarming environmental degradation, growing social and economic polarization,
and poverty and hunger inflicted upon millions of people. One of the key chal-
lenges is the demand for new and innovative ways of thinking to resolve the threats
to the sustainability of our social relations, environment and economies. New
knowledge is required by the social sciences to meet the demands of techological
innovation, management and public policy, and civil society. 
A globalizáció és a demokrácia viszonya sokáig kívül esett az elemzők érdek-
lődési körén. A fenntartható fejlődés és az átláthatóság imperatívusza a gaz-
dasági növekedés korszakában reálisabbnak, míg a pénzügyi válság idején
sokak számára illuzórikusnak tűnhet. A válság nem oldható meg a szabad
piac ideológiájának elveihez való ragaszkodással, sem a megszorítások poli-
tikájára hagyatkozással. A pénzügyi-gazdasági globalizáció hatásainak
kiegyensúlyozása a politikai globalizáció hatékonysága és intenzitása
erősödésének lehetne az eredménye, aminek feltétele, hogy létrejöjjenek a pol-
gárok – és nem csupán az elit – közötti társadalmi és gazdasági  párbeszéd és
együttműködés új transznacionális formái és struktúrái.
A recent survey of 1000 experts from the private and public sectors by the
Global Confidence Index reports that 70% of respondents remained pessimistic
about the state of the global economy; confidence in global governance also
remained at 60% with most respondents pointing to the lack of trust in political
leadership to deal with global risks to account for this consistent pessimism. In
addition, there is a rise from 50% to 60% over the same time period regarding con-
cern about major societal disruptions that are likely to occur over the next year
[Kerala News 2011].  
The question is whether more vigilant analysis of the financial crisis as it
evolves, and the language used in “saving the system” can help to develop a frame-
work to analyze emergent crises that have been subject to the same neglect
through “derivative” and not “innovative” thinking.  A major danger is the current
assumption that the only “confidence” that needs to be (re)built is defined by mar-
ket terminology and not by democratic terminology. It is curious the way “faith” is
now vigorously encouraged by the most hard-headed economists and businessmen
at the focus of the financial crisis. It is seen as central to recovery of the health of
the global economy.
According to the World Bank, financial crises have become more frequent over
the past thirty years. 93 countries experienced an astonishing 112 systemic bank-
ing crises between the late 1970s and the year 2000.  The current crisis may be
even deeper now, however, than past systemic crises because today both the polit-
ical and cultural legitimacy of global capitalism are threatened. This extends to the
abusive and discredited cultures of finance in Europe and the United States and
raises questions concerning the ability of democratic institutions to respond
effectively. Robert Holton argues that:  “Confidence in the capacities of financial
and political institutions to find a way out of the crisis is currently lacking. The
breadth and depth of crisis means that recourse to ideological preferences for
‘free markets’ or tougher public regulation, no longer provide answers that are
analytically satisfactory or sufficiently precise and fine-grained as guides to
action.” [Holton 2012]
Nation-based democratic structures are exposed as inefficient and too self-
interested to adequately navigate the seas of financial uncertainty and perform the
necessary financial reforms. Economists have typically thought of markets as sys-
tems that are autonomous from politics, societies and cultures and function under
the rationality of self-interest. Such confidence has been exhibited by traditional
economic analysts in the market principle that many economists have been per-
suaded that even non-economic institutions, like the family or the state, could be
analyzed as if they were markets. Studying the economics of markets cannot
explain institutional legitimacy or trust, nor can it grasp or address the non-ratio-
nal aspects of social and economic action like greed, for example. 
In addition, the laissez-faire principles based on markets cannot address the wel-
fare needs of large sections of societies. The growth of the welfare state, now in
contraction throughout Europe in response to calls for austerity, in the past provid-
ed a necessary break to and mediation of the most detrimental operations of the
capitalist system. Holton observes that the resurgence of financial deregulation has
been simultaneous with welfare state contraction in Europe. 
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He continues that the shift from face-to-face trading to electronic trading
increasingly separates trading activities from a wider social context and orienta-
tion and magnifies the separation between finance and economics,  and society.
This results in highly destructive behavior on the parts of economic actors. It
encourages impropriety and misconduct, destroys values, employment and trust.
The major challenge, as a result, for regulatory agencies and governments is to how
best to reintegrate markets with the values of social responsibility. To meet both
the analytical and practical challenges, it is necessary to reconnect politics and cul-
ture with the operation of markets and with the broader patterns of social change
[Holton 2012].
We need only to look at the Hayek-Polányi debate to view similar political-ideo-
logical orthodoxy. Hayek’s model of economic management has brought us to the
current crisis; while Polanyi, with extraordinary prescience, warned that the crisis
would come; he rejected the idea that the market is “self-regulating” and can cor-
rect itself. There is no “invisible hand” such as the neoliberals maintain, so there is
nothing inevitable or “natural” about the way markets work: they are always
shaped by political decisions.
1. THE GREAT CONSOLIDATION?
In a recent New York Times article, Ross Douthat looks beyond what he calls the
“anti-establishment theatrics” of populist protest to the deeper structures of
political and economic power. He maintains that “From Washington to Athens,
the economic crisis is producing consolidation rather than revolution, the
entrenchment of authority rather than its diffusion, and the concentration of
power in the hands of the same elite that presided over the disasters in the first
place” [Douthat 2010]. 
When considering the European situation, he writes that for a week after the fis-
cal meltdown in Greece, all the talk was about the weakness of the European
Union, the recklessness of its too-rapid expansion, and the failure of the conti-
nent’s governing class of elites to anticipate the crisis. After the Greek bailout of
nearly a trillion dollars, and dictating economic terms to Athens that resemble “the
kind of thing a surrendering field marshal signs in a railway car in the forest at the
end of a bloody war,” [Applebaum 2010] the EU’s authority over its member states
will be dramatically enhanced. The crisis that was created by rapid, perhaps incau-
tious, elite-driven integration will have led, unrelentingly, to further integration
and a more powerful elite. The public interest or public good has become too
intertwined with private interests for the latter to be allowed to fail, and everything
that has been done consequently to stop the panic in the Eurozone has only
strengthened the symbiosis. Insiders have been further empowered at the expense
of outsiders and the interests of financial markets, bureaucrats and politicians are
tied together as never before. It appears that the system only knows how to move
in one direction towards further economic centralization. “If consolidation creates
a crisis, the answer is further consolidation. If economic centralization has unin-
tended consequences, then you need political centralization to clean up the mess”
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[Douthat 2010]. If a system of governance, like the EU,  fails to prevent economic
disintegration, then it clearly needs to be given more powers to prevent  crises in
the future.  The argument continues that once a system grows sufficiently com-
plex, it does not matter how badly “experts” mismanage things because every cri-
sis increases their authority, since they seem to be the only ones who understand
the system well enough to fix it. But quick fixes tend to make the system even more
complex and centralized, and more vulnerable to the next surprise, natural disas-
ter or economic crisis. This is why, Douthat concludes that despite all of the popu-
lar unrest and protest in Europe and abroad, “this isn’t the end of the ‘too big to fail’
era. It’s the beginning” [Douthat 2010]. 
2. GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND DEMOCRACY
Many critics of economic globalization claim the processes of cross-border trade
and investment together with cross-border capital markets operating within de-
regulated markets undermine both national sovereignty and political democracy
[Holton 2010].
There has been little analysis about the relationship between globalization and
democracy. Trans-national, crossborder connections and interdependencies may
advance globalization further in some aspects (economic and technological)
while not as much in others (politics and regulation, governance in general, and
societies). In the case of the EU, political integration does not match economic
integration and for citizens at the national level there is no immediate political
redress for market and regulatory failures through a system of EU-level political
institutions.  The sovereign debt crisis stems from public bail-outs of the banking
system and leaves citizens at the mercy of powerful market players (global banks,
multinational companies, bond markets) and political elites. Global business reg-
ulation remains organized within a complex, opaque, patchwork of national,
regional and global regimes that elude or obstruct democratic accountability. In
addition, financial markets operate in nanoseconds 24/7, facilitated by informa-
tion technology. Democracy, on the other hand, operates across days, months and
years. This “missmatch of speeds creates enormous tensions” [Houlton 2012].
Resolution of this cognitive dissonance requires both greater transparency of
global finance and its mechanisms and a greater commitment of financial actors
like bankers to enter into dialogue with social forces and democratic institutions.
Both markets and states have failed in this crisis and if the situation is not resolved
it will continue to produce disfunctional consequences including increasing
social unrest. The crisis cannot be resolved by returning to the same principles of
free market ideology and austerity measures. The social costs would be too great
and there is no logic in trying to reform a system through the same structures and
ways of thinking that created the crisis in the first place. One path or approach to
better match financial globalization with effective political globalization might be
to increase international political cooperation by constructing ways to faciliate
the inclusion of the citizens’ concerns (not just elites) in political and economic
dialogue and processes.
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3. TECHNOCRACY, POPULISM AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE
At a recent public debate in Budapest Mark Leonard proposed that the future of
the EU may be on trial today. The dialectic between technocracy and populism is
being played out, he sys, and the question arises can democracy survive in times of
austerity in a neo-liberal straightjacket?  
Technocracy and populism are mirror images: one is managerial, the other charismatic;
one seeks incremental change, the other is attracted by grandiose rhetoric; one is about
problem solving, the other about the politics of identity.  They also have different mod-
els of legitimacy. The technocrats have sought to build legitimacy for the EU by trying to
deliver positive outcomes for different interest groups - businesses, farmers, students,
etc.  Populism, on the other hand, has emerged during a period in which politics is orga-
nized not in factories or party meetings but on the internet. Its claims about distribution
centre around identity [Leonard 2011: 3]. 
Leonard concludes that as EU leaders try and remove European integration
from national politics, the EU’s legitimacy weakens and calls for more democracy
become stronger, and space is left open for the emergence of populist parties. The
reverse is also possible, as in Italy, Greece and Hungary where a technocratic back-
lash can result in national populism. Therefore the dialectic is rather mutually rein-
forcing. 
Crises have always driven the process of integration in the EU, but the question
today is whether the present crisis can be exploited to continue the European pro-
ject. Europe consists of many other institutionalized (OECD, Council of Europe)
and non-institutionalized, civil forms of communication, cooperation and collabo-
ration. This is also clearly evident in the number of coordinated events throughout
Europe of civil organization, disobedience and protest. The emergence of polariz-
ing and populist movements in a significant number of European countries poses
alarming challenges for a future, unified Europe.  It is clear from the present con-
frontation of populist-nationalists in EU countries that without proper communi-
cation channels, solutions will not be found. This may provide a new opportunity
and space for civil movements, joined to other, similar forces throughout Europe,
to fill the vacuum. Dominated by new social networks, networked resistance and
savey young activists do not lack innovative techniques and approaches to address-
ing contemporary political, economic and social problems. It no longer matters so
much where you are in time and space, since these networks, supported by tech-
nology, can provide for a more equal playing field for civil actors. 
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